I. INTRODUCTION
Finding effective means to relieve poverty is a de ning mission for development economics. To this end, a wide range of policy alternatives has been implemented. However, the bene ts of many such efforts have been questioned. Some argue that political constraints on implementation deny the poor the bene ts of redistributive efforts. Others suggest that bene ts to the poor are undermined by disincentives to generate income. Worse still, these disincentives can afflict the nonpoor who try to qualify for assistance. This in turn leads policy analysts to question the wisdom of implementing redistributive policies at all, focusing instead on policies that promote economic growth. Combatting such pessimism requires empirical evidence that some redistributive policies have achieved their stated goals. This paper studies land reform as a redistributive policy. Throughout the postcolonial period, improvement in the asset base of the poor has been viewed as a central strategy to relieve endemic poverty {Chenery et al. 1970} . In a poor agrarian economy, typical of those in many less developed countries, this implies improving the terms on which the poor have access to land. Signi cant political changes, such as decolonization, have sometimes afforded the opportunity to undertake far-reaching land reforms that transfer property rights to the poor. However, such instances are rare, and more incremental measures are common. This is the case in India where land reforms have been on the policy agenda since independence. These reforms have involved only limited efforts at land redistribution, mostly through legislated ceilings on landholding. Legislation aimed at regulating tenancies, for example by improving tenurial security, and reducing the power of absentee landlords and intermediaries are more common. While the latter need not change the distribution of landholdings, they may improve tenants' claims to the returns from their land. This may also bene t the landless by raising agricultural wages.
India is an important case study of land reform. It is both home to a signi cant fraction of the poor in the developing world and in the postindependence period was subjected to the largest body of land reform legislation ever to have been passed in so short a period in any country {Thorner 1976}. The efficacy of this legislation has, however, been much debated. The conventional wisdom following the in uential commentary of Bardhan {1970} is that, while land reform legislation abounds, the real impact on the conditions of the poor is muted by unenthusiastic implementation of proposed changes. However, broad-based quantitative testing of this notion does not appear to have been attempted previously. This paper takes advantage of the state level panel data available for the sixteen main Indian states from 1958 to 1992 to assess this. The state is the natural unit of analysis for land reform given that state governments have jurisdiction over land reform legislation. The relatively long time period covered by the data also allows respectable efforts to deal with some econometric concerns. Our principal nding is that land reforms do appear to have led to reductions in poverty in India. This nding is robust to a number of methods of estimation, and the inclusion/exclusion of many different controls.
We also use our data to investigate the relationship between land reform and growth. This relates to more general debates about how inequality and growth interact. Alesina and Rodrik {1994} and Persson and Tabellini {1995} have argued that initial inequality is bad for economic growth. The link is through the political system-greater inequality encourages redistributive activities that blunt accumulation incentives. However, Hoff and Lyon {1995}, Banerjee and Newman {1993}, and Bé nabou {1996}, among others, have emphasized that when markets are incomplete, then redistribution can alter the terms of agency problems
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in credit markets and foster accumulation decisions, thus undermining the standard equity efficiency trade-off. If accumulation is enhanced by redistribution along the growth path, then we would expect to nd a positive relationship between redistributive efforts and economic growth. The existing literature has focused predominantly on scal redistributions. By affecting access to land, land reform may have a more lasting effect on poverty. This view is consistent with the literature that points to early redistributions of land leading to relatively egalitarian access as being an important precondition for high growth in East Asia (see, for example, Rodrik {1995}).
Most existing empirical evidence on the links between redistribution and growth comes from cross-country data (see Perotti {1996} for a careful review). While informative, there are insurmountable problems of comparability of data across countries and dealing with concerns about endogeneity. The fact that our data come from one country with similar data collection strategies in each state, and the relatively long time period, allow us to make progress on this.
Empirical studies of the impact of land reform are rare since reliable estimation requires data from the pre-and postreform periods. In India there are numerous case studies of land reform (reviewed below), but few attempts to look at the overall picture. Discussion of the theoretical impact of land reform has been dominated by the frequently found inverse farm size-productivity relationship, whence small farmers are supposed to achieve higher yields (see Binswanger et al. {1995}) . This suggests that nding means of evening the distribution of landholding should lead to productivity gains in addition to redistributive bene ts. However, land reforms in India are rarely of a form that could directly exploit this possibility. Moreover, careful analyses, such as Banerjee and Ghatak {1997} show that the theoretical effects on productivity are inherently ambiguous when assessing the impact of tenancy reforms that allow tenants greater security.
Our main nding is that there is a robust link between land reform and poverty reduction. Closer scrutiny reveals that, in an Indian context, this is due primarily to land reforms that change the terms of land contracts rather than actually redistributing land. Consistent with the antipoverty impact, we nd that land reform has raised agricultural wages. The impact of land reform on growth also depends upon the type of land reform. Overall, there is some evidence that the gain in poverty reduction did come LAND, POVERTY, AND GROWTH: INDIA at the expense of lower income per capita. We show that all of these results are consistent with a simple model of agricultural contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses background and data issues. Section III examines the impact that land reforms have had on poverty and deals with potential problems in interpreting the basic results. Section IV addresses the issue as to whether land reforms can have general equilibrium effects by examining their impact on agricultural wages. Section V then turns to the issue of how land reforms have affected economic growth. In Section VI we examine the extent to which land reforms have been redistributive in terms of their effect on the distribution of land and income. In Section VII we develop a theoretical framework that allows us to interpret our results in the light of the literature on agricultural contracting. Section VIII concludes. A Data Appendix details the construction and sources of the key variables used in the analysis.
II. BACKGROUND AND DATA
Under the 1949 Indian Constitution, states were granted the powers to enact (and implement) land reforms. This autonomy ensures that there has been signi cant variation across states and time in terms of the number and types of land reforms that have been enacted (see Table I ). We classify land reform acts into four main categories according to their main purpose (see Mearns {1998}) . The rst category is acts related to tenancy reform. These include attempts to regulate tenancy contracts both via registration and stipulation of contractual terms, such as shares in share tenancy contracts, as well as attempts to abolish tenancy and transfer ownership to tenants. The second category of land reform acts are attempts to abolish intermediaries. These intermediaries who worked under feudal lords (Zamandari) to collect rent for the British were reputed to allow a larger share of the surplus from the land to be extracted from tenants. Most states had passed legislation to abolish intermediaries prior to 1958. However, ve (Gujarat, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) did so during our data period. The third category of land reform acts concerned efforts to implement ceilings on landholdings, with a view to redistributing surplus land to the landless. Finally, we have acts that attempted to allow consolidation of disparate landholdings. Although these reforms, in particular the latter, 
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were justi ed partly in terms of achieving efficiency gains in agriculture, it is clear from the acts themselves and from the political manifestos supporting the acts that the main impetus driving the rst three reforms was poverty reduction. It is therefore interesting to assess whether these reforms were effective in achieving their stated aims. Existing assessments of the effectiveness of these different reforms are highly mixed. Although promoted by the center in various Five Year Plans, the fact that land reforms were a state subject under the 1949 Constitution meant that enactment and implementation was dependent on the political will of state governments {Bandyopadhyay 1986 ; Radhakrishnan 1990; Appu 1996; Behuria 1997; Mearns 1998} . The perceived oppressive character of the Zamandari (and their intermediaries) and their close alliance with the British galvanized broad political support for the abolition of intermediaries and led to widespread implementation of these reforms most of which were complete by the early 1960s {Appu 1996; Mearns 1998}. 1 Centre-state alignment on the issue of tenancy reforms was much less pronounced. 2 With many state legislatures controlled by the landlord class, reforms that harmed this class tended to be blocked, although where tenants had substantial political representation, notable successes in implementation were recorded. Despite the considerable publicity attached to their enactment, political failure to implement was most complete in the case of land ceiling legislation. Here ambivalence in the formulation of policy and numerous loopholes allowed the bulk of landowners to avoid expropriation by distributing surplus land to relations, friends and dependents {Appu 1996; Mearns 1998}. As a result of these problems, implementation of both tenancy reform and land ceiling legislation tended to lag well behind the targets set in the Five Year Plans {Bandy-opadhyay 1986; Radhakrishnan 1990}. 3 Land consolidation legislation was enacted less than the other reforms and, owing partly 1. There were nonetheless some major design aws, most notably the failure to limit the size of home farms of Zamindars or to protect short-term tenants.
2. Warriner {1969} commented that the Congress party (the main political force for most of our period) ''provided both the motivation for land reform and the opposition to it, as a socialist head with a conservative body.'' 3. The Fifth Plan gives a frank assessment of the situation which is directly in line with that of Bardhan {1970}: ''A broad assessment of the programme of land reform adopted since Independence is that the laws for the abolition of intermediary tenures have been implemented fairly efficiently whilst in the elds of tenancy reforms and ceilings on holdings, legislation has fallen short of the desired objectives, and implementation of the enacted laws has been inadequate'' {Fifth Five Year Plan, 1974-79, 2: 43}.
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to the sparseness of land records, implementation has been considered to be both sporadic and patchy only affecting a few states in any signi cant way {Radhakrishnan 1990; Appu 1996; Behuria 1997; Mearns 1998}. Village level studies also offer a very mixed assessment of the poverty impact of different land reforms (see Jayaraman and Lanjouw {1997}). Similar reforms seemed to have produced different effects in different areas leaving overall impact indeterminate. There is some consensus that the abolition of intermediaries achieved a limited and variable success both in redistributing land toward the poor and increasing the security of smallholders (see, e.g., Wadley and Derr {1990}). For tenancy reform, however, whereas successes have been recorded, in particular, where tenants are well organized, there has also been a range of documented cases of imminent legislation prompting landlords to engage in mass evictions of tenants and of the de jure banning of landlord-tenant relationships pushing tenancy underground and therefore, paradoxically, reducing tenurial security (see, e.g., Gough {1989}). Land ceiling legislation, in a variety of village studies, is also perceived to have had neutral or negative effects on poverty by inducing landowners from joint families to evict their tenants and to separate their holdings into smaller proprietary units among family members as a means of avoiding expropriation (see, e.g., Chattopadhyay {1994}). Land consolidation is also on the whole judged not to have been progressive in its redistributive impact given that richer farmers tend to use their power to obtain improved holdings (see, e.g., Drè ze, Lanjouw, and Sharma {1998}). Table II gives a complete picture of land reform legislation, and its classi cation, during our data period. Our empirical analysis aggregates reforms within each category. If land reforms have any effect, then we doubt that this would be instantaneous. Thus, we cumulate land reforms over time, generating a variable that aggregates the number of legislative reforms to date in any particular state. While crude, we believe that it provides a sensible rst pass at analyzing the quantitative effects of land reform. The mean of that variable aggregated across the four categories of land reform is given in column 6 of 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1977 ) Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act All tenants are given complete security of tenure without any right of resumption for the landowner; leases, in general, are banned; law provided for transferring and vesting of all zamindari estates; zamindari was abolished over 60.2 million acres (out of total state area of 72.6 million acres). 5 consolidation of landholdings), where it is possible for a given act to belong to more than one category. In the zamandari land tenure system, which covered 56 percent of privately owned land in British India, the land was vested in the landlord known as Zamindar. Between him and the real cultivator there were several layers of rent receiving intermediaries. Jagirs and inams were free grants of subgrants from the state with the right to collect and appropriate land revenue, though with the passage of time, jagirdars and inamdars became the virtual owners. In their conception the ryotwari and mahalwari land tenure systems did not recognize any intermediary between the state and the cultivator (though ryots and mahals did have full rights to sale, leasing and transfer of land). In ltration of moneylenders and traders into agriculture and the lease of them to tenants led to creation of an intermediary class even in areas typi ed by these land tenure systems.
Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu having a lot of activity while Punjab and Rajasthan have very little. Our poverty data come from a consistent set of gures for the rural and urban areas of India's sixteen major states spanning the period 1958-1992 compiled by Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion {1996}. The measures are based on consumption distributions from 22 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) spanning this period. The poverty line is based on a nutritional norm of 2400 calories per day and is de ned as the level of average per capita total expenditure at which this norm is typically attained. Two poverty measures are considered: the headcount index and the poverty gap. 4 Given that NSS surveys are not annual, weighted interpolation has been used to obtain values between surveys. 5 Our study should be seen in the context of a signi cant overall reduction in poverty throughout our data period-the all-India rural headcount measure has fallen from around 55 percent to 40 percent, and the rural poverty gap from 19 percent to around 10 percent. That said, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in performance across states. 6 Agricultural wage data were also collected to enable us to examine whether land reforms had general equilibrium effects and were thus capable of reaching groups of the poor (e.g., landless laborers) who did not directly bene t from the reforms.
Real values of per capita agricultural, nonagricultural, and combined state domestic product are also available to examine the determinants of growth. Agricultural state domestic product was de ated using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers while the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers was used to de ate the nonagricultural state domestic product. We also constructed a variable to measure agricultural yields. This was de ned as real agricultural state domestic product divided by the net sown area. This crudely captures technological changes in agriculture.
Public nance data at the state level were also collected chie y as a means to control for other government interventions besides land reform. On the expenditure side, the main classi ca-4. The headcount index is the proportion of the population living below the poverty line. The poverty gap is the average distance below the line expressed as a proportion of the poverty line, where the average is formed over the whole population (counting the nonpoor as having zero distance below the line).
5. Below, we check that our results are robust to including only those years where there was an NSS survey round.
6. See Datt and Ravallion {1998} for further discussion.
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tion available for our data period is into development and nondevelopment expenditure. While development expenditure does include expenditure on economic and social services, there is no particular connection between this category and government's efforts to develop the population or infrastructure in their states. 7 Development expenditures are therefore further disaggregated into health and education expenditures that we might expect to have appreciable impacts on poverty. We put these in real per capita terms. We also collected total state taxes as a share of state domestic product as a crude measure of the size of state governments and state redistributive taxes per capita 8 to capture the effort of state governments to redistribute from rich to poor. Population estimates from the ve censuses for 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 , and 1991 were used as additional controls. Between any two censuses these were assumed to grow at a constant (compound) rate of growth, derived from the respective population totals.
III. LAND REFORM AND POVERTY REDUCTION
A. Basic Results
The empirical approach is to run panel data regressions of the form,
(1)
x st 5 a s 1 b t 1 g y st 1 c l st2 4 1 e st , where x st is some measure of poverty in state s at time t, a s is a state xed effect, b t is a year dummy variable, y st is a vector of variables that we treat as exogenous (detailed below), l st2 4 is the stock of past land reforms four periods previously, and e st is an error term which we model as AR (1) process where the degree of autocorrelation is state-speci c; i.e., e st 5 r s e st2 1 1 u st . Estimation via generalized least squares will also allow for heteroskedasticity in the error structure with each state having its own error variance. Equation (1) is a reduced-form model of the impact of land reform. Thus, any effect of land reform on poverty is picked up by 7. Economic services include agriculture and allied activities, rural development, special area programs, irrigation and ood control, energy, industry and minerals, transport and communications, science, technology, and environment. Social services include education, medical and public health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, housing, urban development, labor, and labor welfare, social security and welfare, nutrition, and relief on account of natural calamities.
8. These include land tax, agricultural income tax, and property tax all of which are under the control of state governments.
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that variable along with other effects that change the claims that tenants have to land. The land reform variable will also pick up any general equilibrium effects of land reform through changes in wages and prices. Below, we discuss what kind of theoretical model is consistent with our empirical ndings.
The approach is also reduced form because land reform legislation is used as regressor-we are unable to measure whether land reforms are actually implemented. We cannot distinguish, therefore, between ineffective and unimplemented land reforms. Even though we have no measure of this, there is anecdotal evidence that some land reforms were not fully implemented. Hence, the coefficient on land reform in (1) is likely to provide a lower bound on the true effect of an implemented land reform. We have lagged the land reform variable four periods for two main reasons. 9 First, because even effective legislation will take time to be implemented and to have an impact. Second, it may help to allay concerns that shocks to poverty will be correlated with land reform efforts, an issue to which we return below. Fixed effects at the state level control for the usual array of cross-state differences in history and economic structure that have been constant over our sample period, while the year effects cover for macro-shocks and policies enacted by the central government that affect poverty and growth. Table III gives the basic picture from our data. In column (1) we control for other factors affecting poverty only by using state and year effects. Land reform is represented only by the cumulative land reform variable where all types of land reforms are aggregated. The negative and signi cant association between land reform and the rural poverty gap measure is clear from this. Column (2) con rms that this result is not sensitive to using the interpolated years when there were no NSS rounds. In column (3) land reforms are disaggregated into their component types, also lagged four periods. This suggests that tenancy reforms and the abolition of intermediaries are driving the aggregate effects, while land ceiling legislation and consolidation of landholdings have a negligible impact on rural poverty. Below, we will suggest a theoretical interpretation of the results that is consistent with this nding. The fact that land ceiling legislation is unimportant con rms anecdotal accounts of the failure to implement these reform measures in any serious way {Bardhan 1970; Appu 1996; 9. The results are not sensitive to the exact lag speci cation chosen here. Behuria 1997; Mearns 1998} . Column (4) checks the sensitivity of the ndings to using an alternative measure of poverty-the head-count index. A similar negative impact of tenancy reform and the abolition of intermediaries on poverty is found here.
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If land reform is really responsible for these results (rather than some omitted variable that is correlated with land reform), (2) is smaller as it is only run for years when NSS surveys were carried out. Poverty measures in other regressions have been interpolated between survey years. The GLS AR(1) model allows a state-speci c AR(1) process-see equation (1) in the text for details. In columns (6) and (7) the poverty gap difference is the difference between the rural and urban poverty gap. In column (5) the headcount difference is the difference between the rural and urban head-count index.
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406 then we would not expect to see such effects on urban poverty. There is no good reason to think production and distribution decisions in the urban sector would be affected (apart from some complex general equilibrium reasons). This is con rmed in column (5) of Table III which nds no signi cant negative association between land reform and urban poverty as measured by the same NSS data. This adds credence to the idea that our land reform variable is picking up something peculiar to the rural sector.
Columns (6)- (8) use the difference between rural and urban poverty as the left-hand-side variable. As we observed from column (5), urban poverty does not respond to land reform. This helps to control for any omitted variables that have common effects on poverty in both places. 10 Column (6) con rms our nding that aggregate cumulative land reforms lagged four periods are negatively associated with a reduction in rural-urban poverty difference. Results broken out by type of land reform are consistent with those for rural poverty: tenancy reforms and the abolition of intermediaries have had a signi cant impact in closing rural-urban poverty gap while the impact of the other two types of land reform are insigni cant (column (7)). Using the gap between rural and urban head-count index yields similar ndings (column (8)).
Taken together, these results demonstrate a consistent picture. 11 Land reform in general appears to be associated with reductions in rural poverty, with these effects most strongly 10. Unlike poverty levels, it is also a variable that does not trend downward overtime. In the levels regression the cumulative nature of our land reform variable makes it difficult to identify its effect separately from a state-speci c time trend. Indeed, including state-speci c time trends as regressors in a poverty levels regression leads to the land reform variable becoming less signi cant. However, when the poverty difference is included as the left-hand-side variable, the effect of land reforms remains signi cant even when state-speci c time trends are included.
11. These results assume that the effects of each land reform work independently from one another. To re ect the possibility that packaging of certain reforms is important, we ran our basic speci cations including interactions between the different types of land reforms. No general pattern emerges from this exercise, although there is some suggestive evidence that undertaking both tenancy reform and abolition of intermediaries together enhances the impact of land reform further. However, this nding is somewhat sensitive to the exact measure of poverty used and the inclusion of particular control variables. We also considered whether there was a difference between land reforms enacted recently compared with those more than ten years ago. To this end, we reran the main results separating out a variable cumulating recent land reforms and those more than ten years old. We found that both enter negatively and signi cantly in the poverty regressions, with the older land reforms frequently taking an (absolutely) large coefficient. Following Moene {1992}, we also investigated whether land reforms in more densely populated states appeared to have a larger impact on poverty. For most of the speci cations that we looked at, this was indeed the case.
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associated with land reforms that seek to abolish intermediaries and reform the conditions of tenancies.
B. Robustness
While these results are clean, they leave two signi cant concerns unmet. First, they make no effort to allow for other policies that affect poverty-land reform may be proxying for other policies that are correlated with poverty reduction. Second, land reform could be endogenous and responding to the same forces that drive poverty. We now address both of these concerns. Table IV reports results that include an array of additional controls. All regressions now include the population growth rate and agricultural yield lagged four periods. The latter may proxy for other policies that could have enhanced agricultural productivity and are correlated with land reform. It may also pick up exogenous technological change. Our policy measures are in two categories: re ecting the expenditure and tax policies of state governments. Our expenditure variables are health expenditures per capita, education expenditures per capita, and other expenditures per capita. 12 The former two might be thought to be important determinants of poverty reduction efforts. On the tax side, we have two rather crude measures that give a picture of the general policy stance of the government in office. State taxes expressed as a share of state domestic product crudely serve to measure the size of the state government. We can also measure how much the government is intent on designing a tax system that is geared toward taxing the better off. We create a measure of the progressiveness of the tax system under state control. This is the sum of land taxes, agricultural income taxes, and property taxes expressed in real per capita terms. All policy variables are lagged four periods to give the same timing structure as the land reform variables and to minimize concerns about the possible endogeneity of these policy variables.
In columns (1)-(6) of Table IV we replicate the regressions of land reform on poverty including these other policies. 13 Irrespective of the speci cation, state redistributive taxes and state tax share exert signi cant negative impacts on rural poverty whereas 12. That is total expenditure excluding health and education. 13. We experimented with an array of speci cations that included a larger array of controls for government expenditure including those on food security, famine relief, rural infrastructure, and other social services and ner disaggregations of taxes. Including these variables did not affect our key results in any signi cant way so we have decided to use a more parsimonious speci cation. -1975 and 1978 , for Jammu and Kashmir 1968 -1991 , for Bihar and Gujarat 1964 -1975 and 1977 , for Tamil Nadu 1964 -1975 and 1978 and for Bihar 1964 , 1969 and 1972 -1977 . This gives us a total sample size of 436. In column (5) the poverty gap difference is the difference between the rural and urban poverty gap. In column (6) the head-count difference is the difference between the rural and urban head-count index. The GLS AR(1) model allows a state-speci c AR(1) process-see equation (1) in the text for details. Redistributive taxes are agricultural income taxes, land taxes, and property taxes.
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education and health expenditure, per capita yield, and population growth are generally insigni cant at conventional levels. 14 In column (1) we include the full set of policy control variables in the basic regression of cumulative land reform on the rural poverty gap measure. Despite controlling for these many dimensions of state activity, cumulative land reform continues to exert a negative and signi cant impact on rural poverty. In column (2) we run the same regression while disaggregating the land reform variable. We continue to nd that tenancy reforms and the abolition of intermediaries exert a negative and signi cant impact on the rural poverty gap measure whereas land ceiling and land consolidation legislation exert no signi cant in uence. Replacing the poverty gap measure with the head-count index as is done in column (3) produces a similar set of results. When we examine the urban poverty regression (column (4)), we nd that, in common with the rural poverty regressions, health and education expenditure and yield have no signi cant impact and tax share has a signi cant impact. State redistributive taxes are insigni cant in this regression suggesting that their impact is restricted to the rural sector. Inclusion of these extra variables has no effect on the insigni cant impact of cumulative land reform on urban poverty. Columns (5) and (6) regress the difference between rural and urban poverty on cumulative land reform and the full set of control variables. Note that compared with column (1) of this table, only the land reform variable and state redistributive taxes remain signi cant in this speci cation. 15 Other policy effects appear to be common to both rural and urban sectors, becoming insigni cant in this regression. Contrasting columns (5) and (6) con rms that results are robust to the type of poverty measure being used. Taken together, the results presented in Table IV offer further con rmation of our initial nding of a signi cant negative association between lagged land reform and rural poverty.
A further concern with the speci cation in equation (1) is the potential endogeneity of the land reform variable. It is not possible to ascertain the direction of bias due to this a priori. If 14. The expenditure results are interesting given the priority attached, in current debates, to expansion of expenditures on education and health as a key means of reducing poverty (see Drèze and Sen {1995}) . If anything, education expenditures per capita seem to exert a positive in uence on the rural poverty gap (columns (1) and (2)) but not on the rural head-count ratio (column (3)). However, it is possible that we would need ner measures of the ways in which particular programs are prioritized to make progress on this.
15. An exception is education expenditure per capita in the poverty gap speci cation (see column (5)).
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land reform is purposefully aimed at poverty reduction, then we would expect policy effort to focus on where poverty is highest, leading to downward bias. However, if responsiveness to land reform is greater where poverty is highest, then the effect may go in the other direction. While lagging land reform as we have in (1) goes some way toward minimizing concerns about this, there is some residual worry that long-lived shocks to poverty that affect antipoverty legislation could bias the results.
To x this problem requires an instrument for land reform. 16 To this end, we exploit the fact that land reform is intensely political, with different groupings in state legislatures (the Vidhan Sabha) being more likely to enact land reform legislation. However, this can be problematic if, as seems likely, shocks to poverty affect who is elected. To mitigate this problem, we propose using long lags of the political variables as instruments for land reform. Speci cally, political variables from four periods prior to the land reform (eight periods before the poverty observation) are used as an instrument for land reform. This is legitimate provided that contemporaneous shocks to poverty are uncorrelated with shocks that lead to particular groups being elected eight years previously. Such an assumption seems defensible given both the frequency of elections and policy shifts in India and because it is difficult to think of long-lasting shocks affecting both current poverty and political structure eight years ago.
This strategy implies a rst-stage equation for land reform: (2) for the different kinds of land reforms. As we would expect, all cases nd lagged land reforms to be strongly signi cant. The political variables also matter for land reform legislation, and are jointly signi cant in all columns. In column (1) we see that, relative to the omitted ''other'' category, which is composed of a amalgam of regional, independent, and Janata parties, Congress and soft left decrease the probability of enacting land reform legislation, while hard left exerts a positive in uence and Hindu parties are insigni cant. Looking across columns (2) to (5), we see that the negative in uence of Congress is spread across all types of land reform, but it is particularly pronounced for tenancy reforms and abolition of intermediaries. The negative in uence of soft left parties is also spread across the board with the exception of land consolidation. The overall positive in uence of hard left parties, however, seems to originate principally through a strong positive effect on the passage of land ceiling legislation. This is interesting given our failure to nd evidence that such reforms reduce poverty. Hindu party representation appears to exert no in uence on the passage of tenancy reforms or the abolition of intermediaries. However, they exert a signi cant positive in uence on land ceiling and a signi cant negative in uence on land consolidation.
Table VI presents our results from instrumental variables estimation. Column (1), which uses political variables and lagged land reforms as instruments, continues to nd a negative and signi cant impact of land reform on the rural poverty gap. We nd a similar result when we use the head-count poverty measure in place of the poverty gap measure in column (2). Columns (3) and (4) follow a similar instrumentation procedure but break out total land reforms into constituent types. This con rms our earlier results; both tenancy reforms and abolition of intermediaries remain negative and signi cant while other types of land reform 1965 -1991 , for Kerala and West Bengal 1962 -1991 , for Gujarat and Maharashtra 1963 and for Bihar 1962 -1989 . This gives us a total sample size of 474. The parties contained in the relevant group are given in parentheses after the name of the grouping. These are ( 1973 , for Jammu and Kashmir 1969 , and for Gujarat and Maharashtra 1967 . This gives us a total sample size of 410. In column (5) 
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are insigni cant. 17 Column (5) con rms that land reform still has a signi cant impact in closing the gaps between rural and urban poverty. We also report tests of our overidentifying restrictions for the instrumental variables regressions. The political and lagged land reform variables pass standard statistical tests of overidentication and therefore, at least on econometric grounds, would appear to be suitable instruments for land reforms. 18 Thus, when the instrument set includes political variables and lagged land reforms, the picture is consistent with the patterns of results shown in Tables III and IV. The remainder of Table VI experiments with alternatives to using lagged land reforms as instruments. In columns (6)- (8) we use cumulative land reforms passed in geographically neighboring states (lagged eight periods) in our instrument set in place of cumulative land reforms lagged eight periods. These neighboring land reforms could proxy for regional waves of support for land reform. Using these, together with the political variables as instruments, yields robust results. Aggregate land reforms continue to exert a negative and signi cant impact on the rural poverty gap (column (6)) or rural head count (column (7)). When we break out land reforms by type, we again nd tenancy reforms and abolition of intermediaries exerting the strongest negative in uences on the head-count index (column (8)). The overidentication tests are also passed. In columns (9) and (10) of Table VI, we drop lagged land reforms completely from the instrument set. We continue to obtain a negative impact of land reforms on the rural poverty gap (column (9)) or the rural headcount (column (10)) for aggregate land reforms. 19 Taken together, Table VI nds a pattern of results that is consistent with those presented in Tables III and IV . 20 It is also reassuring that the magnitude of coefficients remains roughly 17. With the exception of land ceilings in column (3). 18. The test we employ is due to Sargan {1958} and tests whether the instruments are correlated with residuals from the second-stage (poverty) regression. See notes to Table VI. 19. We did not obtain signi cant effects for disaggregated land reforms in this speci cation.
20. We also experimented with a fourth instrumentation procedure where the endogenous policy variable (cumulative land reforms lagged four periods) is instrumented using a ''simulated'' cumulative land index created by cumulating values from a linear probability model which predicts whether a land reform takes place in a given year based on political composition of the state parliament (lagged four periods) and year and state effects. As with the three other procedures, we found that instrumented aggregate land reform had a signi cant negative impact on the rural poverty gap.
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constant across the different instrumentation procedures. On the whole, the instrumented coefficients on land reform are larger than the baseline results of Tables III and IV . Overall, these results are best thought of as a robustness check on our earlier ndings rather than trying to present a carefully thought out structural model.
IV. LAND REFORM AND AGRICULTURAL WAGES
It would be surprising if land reforms that affected poverty did not impact on other aspects of the rural economy. We now consider whether such reforms have an effect on agricultural wages. The wage data are for the daily agricultural wages of male laborers expressed in real terms. 21 Agricultural wages are a robust indicator of the welfare of landless laborers who comprise a signi cant fraction of the poor in rural India (see World Bank {1997}). If land reform pushes up agricultural wages, this represents an additional mechanism through which these reforms can reduce rural poverty.
The results using the agricultural wage as a left-hand-side variable are in Table VII . Column (1) contains results for the aggregate land reform variable. This demonstrates a positive and signi cant impact of land reform on wages. In column (2) this effect is disaggregated across types of land reform and shows that this effect is primarily attributable to legislation to abolish intermediaries. These results con rm the impact of land reforms on the rural economy. They also illustrate an indirect route through which land reform may positively affect the welfare of landless laborers even if they do not bene t directly from the reforms. In Section VII we discuss why such effects might be present in theory.
V. LAND REFORM AND GROWTH
Even if land reform does help the poor, it could do so at a cost to economic performance. We turn now, therefore, to exploring whether land reform has a positive or negative effect on agricultural output per capita. In this case, we use the log of real state income per capita as the left-hand-side variable with the righthand side augmented by lagged log real state income per capita to 21 . See the Data Appendix for details.
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model dynamics in a very simple way and to allow for convergence over time. 22 We therefore have a regression of the form,
This is basically the same form of regression that has become popular in the cross-country growth literature summarized in Barro {1997}, although our panel data allow us to use xed effects and year effects. We will also continue to allow for a state-speci c AR(1) error speci cation with heteroskedasticity. Table VIII presents the main results for the regression of state income per capita on cumulative land reform. In column (1) we present results for a GLS model of total state income per capita on land reform containing only state xed effects and year effects as controls. We nd that the disaggregated land reform variables 22. Statewise estimates of total and agricultural state domestic product are available for the 1960-1992 period. See the Data Appendix. These state domestic product estimates are used as our proxy of state income. (1) and (2) we have data 1961-1992 for twelve states, for Punjab and Haryana, which split in 1965, we have data 1966 for Jammu and Kashmir 1965-1992; and for Bihar 1961 and for Bihar , 1966 and for Bihar , and 1969 and for Bihar -1992 . This gives a sample size of 484. The sample size in column (4) is slightly larger as it does not contain a lagged dependent variable as regressor. For columns (3) and (5) we have data 1964-1992 for nine states, for Punjab 1969 , for Haryana 1970 -1975 and 1978 , for Jammu and Kashmir 1968 , for Bihar and Gujarat 1964 -1975 and 1977 , for Assam 1969 and 1972 and for Tamil Nadu 1964 -1975 and 1978 . This gives a sample size of 433. GLS AR(1) model allows a state-speci c AR(1) process-see equation (1) in the text for details.
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lagged four periods have no signi cant impact on total state income per capita. In column (2) we look only at agricultural state income per capita. This makes sense given that land reform is predominantly concerned with affecting production relations in agriculture. This suggests that tenancy reform has a negative effect on agricultural output with land consolidation having the opposite effect. No effect is observed for the other kinds of land reform. Column (3) shows that both the tenancy reform and land consolidation effects are robust to including our other policy variables lagged four years. In column (4) we show that these effects remain when agricultural yields rather than income per capita is the left-hand-side variable. 23 In column (5) we show that this effect of tenancy reform is robust to including other policy variables.
VI. LAND REFORM AND LAND INEQUALITY
Taken together, our results hint at an equity-efficiency tradeoff for tenancy reforms-both poverty and output per capita are lower after such reforms are enacted. No such trade-off emerges for abolition of intermediaries. Ceilings on landholdings do not seem to have an effect on either output measures or poverty, while land consolidation promotes output increases in agriculture without affecting poverty. The failure of land ceiling legislation to show any signi cant impact on poverty reduction or output levels is consistent with Bardhan's {1970} claim that such reforms have rarely been implemented with any degree of seriousness.
Overall, these results suggest that the impact on poverty comes mainly through reforms that affect production relations, rather than by altering the distribution of land. This interpretation is underlined by looking at the limited evidence available on the relationship between land reforms and land distribution over our data period. Data on land distribution has only been gathered by NSS special surveys at four points; 1953 -1954 , 1961 -1962 , 1971 -1972 , and 1982 . We classify states as high or low land reform depending on whether they had more or less than a total of three land reforms (of any type) during the 1958-1992 period. 24 We then investigate whether high land 23. Our measure of yield is real agricultural state domestic product divided by net sown area. See the Data Appendix for details.
24. Under this system Andra Pradesh, Assam, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Madya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Rajasthan are low land reform LAND, POVERTY, AND GROWTH: INDIA reform states classi ed in this way experienced the largest drop in the gini for land operated and proportion of landless households over the period. 25 The overall impression that we have from this crude exercise, is of persistent inequalities in land operated within both groups of states (see also Sharma {1994}). Thus, the idea that the major impact of land reform on poverty must come mainly through mechanisms that did not involve land redistribution gains further support. In further con rmation of this, we failed to nd a signi cant effect of aggregate land reform on the gini coefficient for rural per capita consumption. 26 Thus, in making sense of the results, it is imperative to think about land reforms that have changed production relations in agriculture rather than altering the pattern of landholdings. All of this notwithstanding, there is evidence that the impact of land reforms on poverty is greatest in those states where land inequality was greatest in [1953] [1954] . To test this, we interacted the percentage of landless individuals and the land gini coefficient with our land reform variable. This interaction term was negative and signi cant in every case when we looked at aggregate land reform activity. 27 
VII. MAKING SENSE OF THE RESULTS
Our empirical analysis suggests that poverty reduction is associated with land reform and this is primarily attributable to legislation that has abolished intermediaries and reformed the terms of tenancies. The role of land redistribution per se seems to have been of limited importance in the Indian context. The empirical analysis also uncovers some evidence of general equilibrium effects on wages. Our theoretical model focuses on two things: a model of agricultural contracting and a model of labor states, while Bihar, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal are high land reform states.
25. For high land reform states the land gini falls from 0.686 in 1953/54 to 0.669 in 1982 (a fall of 0.017), whereas the drop in low land reform states is from 0.653 to 0.643 (a drop of 0.010). For high land reform states the average drop in the proportion landless is from 14.97 percent to 12.03 percent (a fall of 2.94 percent), whereas for low land reform states the drop is from 12.40 percent to 10.91 percent (a fall of 1.49 percent).
26. To look at this issue, we ran the basic regression shown in column (1) of Table III but replaced the rural poverty gap with the gini coefficient for rural per capita consumption. Our inability to nd a signi cant impact on rural inequality could be explained by the fact that land reform may be shifting income from the middle income groups to the poor rather than from the rich to the poor.
27. The results are available from the authors on request.
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supply by tenants. The former focuses on how rents to tenants shift in response to land reforms, and the latter gives rise to effects on agricultural wages. This focus on contractual problems captures the spirit of recent models of the inequality-growth relationship that emphasize agency problems, particularly in credit markets. (See Bénabou {1996} for a survey.) Here, we emphasize agency problems in tenancy contracts and how they can be altered by land reform, even if the ownership pattern is unchanged. There are three groups: landlords who rent out land as well as farming some of the land themselves, tenants who rent land, and landless laborers. The poor are made up predominantly of the latter two groups. Tenants and landless laborers supply labor to the labor market where it is demanded by landlords who choose to be owner-cultivators. Tenants and landless laborers care about consumption c and labor supply l. Their preferences are u(c) 2 f (l), where u(·) is increasing and concave and f (·) is increasing and convex. Suppose that the agricultural wage is v . Then, an individual with nonlabor income x, has optimal labor supply of
It is straightforward to check that labor supply is decreasing in x. Now de ne v(x,v ) 5 u(x 1 v l*(x,v )) 2 f (l*(x,v )) as the indirect utility of a tenant with nonlabor income x. Hence, we expect landless laborers to supply l*(0,v ), while for tenants x is equal to the value of their tenancy. As the value of tenancy increases as a result of land reform, we would expect tenants to reduce labor supply to the market.
We now consider the agricultural contracting problem of a tenant and landlord. Suppose that the output on a given piece of land under tenancy is given by R(e) where e denotes effort applied to the land by the tenant. We suppose that the cost of this effort is separable from labor supply and is measured in units of disutility. Effort is also committed before the labor supply decision is made. We assume that R(·) is smooth, increasing, and concave.
We suppose that tenants need to be monitored in order to put in effort on the land. Speci cally, we imagine that a contract speci es an effort level of e. However, the tenant may choose to ''shirk,'' putting in zero effort, in which case the landlord catches him with probability p and he is red, becoming a landless laborer and receiving a payoff of v(0,v ). The tenant can now only be induced to supply effort if the threat of eviction is sufficiently strong and some rents are earned from being a tenant. Suppose, LAND, POVERTY, AND GROWTH: INDIA then, that the tenant receives a payment of w to farm the land, which he receives only if he is not caught shirking. Thus, a tenant is willing to put in an effort level e at payment w if and only the incentive constraint ( It is straightforward to calculate the impact of changes in p on output and the tenant's payoff. An increase in p will increase net-output since e( p,v ) is increasing. The effect on the tenant's payoff (and hence poverty) is given by
The rst term is positive-an increase in the eviction probability elicits higher effort and hence raises the tenant's rent. The second effect works in the opposite direction. For a given effort level, the tenant's rent is lower since he must be paid less now to prevent him from shirking. We are interested in cases where the tenant enjoys a more secure right to the land so that p falls. In this case, the tenant will bene t from a tenancy reform that reduces the probability that he will be evicted if caught shirking if the elasticity of effort with respect to the probability of eviction ( e( p,v )/ p · p/e( p,v ) ) is less than 1/{(1 2 p) p 2 }. If tenants' rents increase from receiving higher tenure security, then this will lead them to reduce their labor supply to the market, and we would predict that such a tightening of the labor market would lead to increased agricultural wages. 28 This framework can be applied to the cases of abolition of intermediaries and tenancy reform. To include an intermediary in 28. These changes in wages would also be expected to reinforce reductions in output on farms that hire in labor.
the analysis, we suppose that there are three parties to the agricultural contract: a tenant, landlord, and an intermediary. We begin by making the strong assumption that intermediaries have a very strong bargaining position can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the landlord and tenant. This is very much in line with the view that intermediaries captured the surplus from the land. In this world the tenant will receive a payoff of V ( p,v ) , and the landlord will receive his reservation payoff which we denote by v L . The intermediary receives the surplus {R(e( p,v ) 
After the intermediary is abolished, this surplus is now available for distribution provided that p remains the same. Only if the tenant obtains no bargaining power at all with his landlord, would we expect to observe no effect on the tenant's payoff. Otherwise, we would expect to see the tenant's payoff rise. Assuming that tenants are a signi cant group of poor in India, this is consistent with our nding that poverty is reduced by the abolition of intermediaries. We would not expect to see any change in effort and hence output unless p were different when landlords and intermediaries negotiated contracts. Rent increases for tenants also would be associated with higher agricultural wages, by the general equilibrium mechanism we have identi ed.
We now turn to the impact of tenancy reforms. Such reforms are multifarious which make it difficult to offer a de nitive theoretical account. This would require much more institutional content as in the analysis of West Bengal's land reforms by Banerjee and Ghatak {1997}. Nonetheless, it is still useful to think through a simple model in order to check that our empirical ndings conform to the predictions of the theory laid out above. Suppose therefore that the landlord has all the bargaining power and can make take-it-or-leave-it offers to tenants before and after the tenancy reform. We shall model the effect of a tenancy reform as making it more difficult to evict tenants if they shirk. In terms of our model this is equivalent to a fall in p. As we have already argued, this has two effects. First, we expect effort, and therefore, output to fall. Second, we expect a change in the payoff to the tenant as his rent could go up or down. We showed that this is positive under reasonable conditions, and thus we would expect poverty to be reduced which is what we found in the data. This is also consistent with higher agricultural wages if increased rents to tenants lead them to reduce their labor supply.
To summarize, the empirical ndings are consistent with a stylized model of agricultural contracting and labor supply by tenants. While many complicating features could be added to the theory, the general thrust of the trade-off captured here is relevant. 29 It is well-known that in a variety of contexts, rents are used to motivate tenants. Thus, land reforms that affect how agency problems are solved will typically generate both output and distributional effects. We would expect these rents to affect labor supply and result in changes to agricultural wages.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main contribution of this paper is to test whether land reform legislation is associated with poverty reductions using state-level data from India. The high incidence of poverty and the large volume of land reforms enacted to counter this problem in the post-Independence period make this an issue of considerable interest. We show that there is robust evidence of a link between poverty reduction and two kinds of land reform legislationtenancy reform and abolition of intermediaries. Another important nding is that land reform can bene t the landless by raising agricultural wages. Although the effects on poverty are likely to have been greater if large-scale redistribution of land had been achieved, our results are nonetheless interesting as they suggest that partial, second-best reforms which mainly affect production relations in agriculture can play a signi cant role in reducing rural poverty.
As well as being important to policy debates in India, such ndings may help to diffuse the more general pessimism that can undermine redistributive effort in developing countries. In a recent study {World Bank 1997}, much emphasis was placed on the role of economic growth in explaining the decline of poverty in India. While our results are consistent with this nding, they emphasize that redistributive effort has also played its part. Using the average number of land reforms implemented, our rst coefficient in Table III implies that a reduction of the all-India poverty gap of 1 percent can be explained by land reform. This is one-tenth of the actual reduction in poverty over the period of our data. This remains true even after factoring in the possibility that output per capita is reduced by some kinds of land reform (Table   29 . Following Banerjee and Ghatak {1997}, it would be possible to introduce investment into the model. In general, we would expect increased tenurial security to increase investment.
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VIII). To put this in perspective, we compared the effect of land reforms on poverty with the effect of changes in per capita income. This comparison suggests that implementing a land reform has a similar effect on poverty reduction to a 10 percent increase in per capita income, or around four to ve years growth at the all-India average growth rate over this period. 30 Since the effects of redistributive intervention on poverty and growth are not known a priori, a signi cant literature has tested these links using cross-country data. Bénabou {1996} reviews this literature and emphasizes the diverse ndings. While adding to our general understanding, the difficulties of nding reliable cross-country measures of redistribution is a signi cant drawback in this research agenda. There seems little doubt, therefore, that exploiting policy variation due to the federal structure of some developing countries may be an important additional source of evidence on policy incidence. It will also help to get behind broad brush policy categories such as education or health expenditures that mask important policy variations. Our study underlines that, even within a particular area of government intervention (i.e., land reform), the empirical effects may vary depending on the exact form that the intervention takes. This is true, moreover, even though our policy measures are themselves fairly broad. Future efforts to quantify the empirical relationship between growth, poverty, and redistribution will doubtless bene t even more from a detailed speci cation of how particular policy interventions are structured and implemented across space and time.
DATA APPENDIX
The data used in the paper come from a wide variety of sources. 31 They come from the sixteen main states listed in Table  I . Haryana split from the state of Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate observations for Punjab and Haryana.
30. Thus, we regressed poverty on per capita income (along with state effects and year effects) and compared the coefficient on per capita income with that obtained on land reform. (It made essentially no difference whether we did this by including both land reform and per capita income in one regression, or ran separate regressions in one case including only land reform and in the other only income per capita.) Results are available from the authors on request.
31. Our analysis has been aided by Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion {1996} which collects published data on poverty, output, wages, prices indices, and population to construct a consistent panel data set on Indian states for the period 1958 to 1992. We are grateful to Martin Ravallion for providing us with these data, to which we have added information on land reform, public nance, and political representation.
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To construct the land reform variable used in the regressions, we begin by recording all land reform acts that were passed in a given state and year. By examining the content of each land reform, we then classify each land reform act into four categories (1 5 tenancy reform, 2 5 abolition of intermediaries, 3 5 ceilings on landholdings, 4 5 consolidation of landholdings) where a single land reform can belong to several types (see Table II ). For each land reform type this gives us a variable that is 0 or 1 in given state s and year t. We cumulate these variables over time to give us four cumulative land reform variables that capture the stock of land reforms passed to date in each of the four categories. We also aggregate across all four land reform categories to give us an aggregate cumulative land reform variable that gives us a measure of the total stock of land reforms passed in state s by year t. Amendments to acts are treated as new pieces of legislation. The Index to Central and State Enactments (Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India) was used to identify Acts pertaining to land reform in different states. To examine the exact content of these acts, we mainly used Haque and Sirohi {1986} and Zaidi {1985}, although a range of secondary sources were used to double-check the correctness of the information provided by these two books and to ll in and update the detail regarding speci c legislations. The secondary sources included Appu {1996}, Behuria {1997}, Bonner {1987}, Borgohain {1992}, Kurien {1981}, Mearns {1998}, Pani {1983}, Singh and Misra {1964}, and Yugandhar and Iyer {1993}.
Poverty Data
We use the poverty measures for the rural and urban areas of India's sixteen major states, spanning 1957-1958 to 1991-1992 put together by Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion {1996}. These measures are based on 22 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS) which span this period. Not all 22 rounds of the survey can be covered for each of the 22 rounds for each of the 16 states. 32 The NSS rounds are also not evenly spaced: the average interval 32. For 11 states (Andra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal), all 22 rounds have been covered. Because Haryana only appears as a separate state from Punjab in 1965, we have adopted including separate series for these two states from this date onward. For Gujarat and Maharashtra, twenty rounds are included, beginning with the sixteenth round in 1958-1959 (before 1958-1959 , separate distributions are not available for these two states as they were merged under the
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between the midpoints of the surveys ranges from 0.9 to 5.5 years. Surveys were carried out in the following years : 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, and 1992 . Because other data are typically available on a yearly basis, weighted interpolation has been used to generate poverty measures for years where there was no NSS survey. The poverty lines used are those recommended by the Planning Commission {1993} and are as follows. The rural poverty line is given by a per capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 49 at October 1973-June 1974 all-India rural prices. The urban poverty line is given by a per capita monthly expenditure of Rs. 57 at October 1973-June 1974 all-India urban prices. See Datt {1995} for more details on the rural and urban cost of living indices and on the estimation of the poverty measures. The headcount index and poverty gap measures are estimated from the grouped distributions of per capita expenditure published by the NSS, 33 using parameterized Lorenz curves using a methodology detailed in Datt and Ravallion {1992}.
Agricultural Wages
The primary source for the data is Agricultural Wages in India (Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India). Nominal wage data from this series have been de ated using the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers to obtain real agricultural wages. No agricultural wage data are available for the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and no separate wage data are available for the state of Haryana.
Income Data
The primary source for data on state income is an annual government publication Estimates of State Domestic Product (Department of Statistics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning). The primary source for the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) and Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW) which are used to de ate agricultural and nonagricultural state domestic product respectively is a number of Government of India publications which include Instate of Bombay). For Jammu and Kashmir, only eighteen rounds can be included, beginning with the sixteenth round for 1960-1961, 
Public Finance Data
The primary source for state level information on taxes and expenditures is an annual publication, Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, Government of India). This information is also collated in the Reserve Bank of India's annual publication Report on Currency and Finance.
Population Data
The population estimates are constructed using Census data from the ve censuses for 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991 (Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner, Government of India). Between any two successive censuses, the state-sectoral populations are assumed to grow at a constant (compound) rate of growth, derived from the respective population totals.
Political Variables
Political variables are the main instruments used in the paper. Data on the number of seats won by different national parties at each of the state elections are from Butler, Lahiri, and Roy {1991}. These primary data are aggregated into four political groupings which are de ned in the text and expressed as shares of the total number of seats in state legislatures. State political con gurations are held constant between elections.
